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THE SLAVE, THE FETUS, THE BODY:
ARTICULATING BIOPOWER AND THE
PREGNANT WOMAN
Kevin Kuswa, Paul Achter University of Richmond, and
Elizabeth Lauzon, University of Southern California
Abstract: Many slaveholders attempted to justify the institution
of slavery in the United States by claiming that the practice of
slavery was actually in the interests of the slaves themselves.
Not only are these arguments invalid because they justify
inhumane treatment and the imprisonment of innocent human
beings, they also contain a dangerous paternalism (a “speaking
for”) that has not vacated the social sphere. Indeed, this same
logic—the notion that bodies can be regulated and controlled
for their own protection—is presently being used to speak for
the fetus in order to justify fetal rights. Borrowing from Berlant
(1997), these fetal rights arguments work against the interests of
the mother, constituting pregnant women as chattel and
reinforcing the governing logics of a fetal and infantile
citizenship.
In the spirit of W.E.B. Du Bois, we contend that, “she must
have the right of motherhood at her own discretion,” regardless
of deployments of fetal citizenship (2007, p. 121). A pregnant
woman should have the right to abort the fetus just as those
enslaved had and have the right to freedom. Following
Koppelman, we note that abortion restrictions result in the
involuntary servitude of women to the fetus and effectively
impede pregnant women from exercising their right to break a
contract with the fetus. Consequently this essay argues that we
have the responsibility to defend reproductive freedom based on
the concept of prohibiting involuntary servitude.
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Introduction
In a speech given to the Commonwealth Club in San
Francisco, in August 1999, Senator John McCain explained
his stance on abortion this way:
I’d love to see a point where [Roe v. Wade] is
irrelevant, and could be repealed because abortion is
no longer necessary. But certainly in the short term,
or even the long term, I would not support repeal of
Roe v. Wade, which would then force x number of
women to [undergo] illegal and dangerous
operations (Marinucci, 1999).
As a presidential candidate McCain’s views have become
much less confusing, and he now opposes abortion rights
and favors overturning Roe. This past year, in an interview
with “Meet the Press,” McCain bluntly stated that he has
“always been pro-life, unchanging and unwavering”
(Conason, 2008). Apparently nine years and a presidential
nomination race have changed Senator McCain’s views. If
this trend continues, it will not be long before McCain is
making claims like his former opponent and fellow
Republican Mike Huckabee. As the 2008 Republican
primary race took shape, an interviewer asked Huckabee if
use of the so-called “morning after” pill “counted” as an
abortion. He stated in his answer: “Anything that ends the
life after it has been fertilized to me is problematic, because
it is a life at that point” (Scherer, 2007). Elaborating, the
Baptist pastor and former Arkansas governor added that the
time had come for the view that abortion is murder to
prevail: “... it took us a long time to come to the conviction
that slavery was fundamentally wrong and that it was not a
political issue, but a moral issue.”
Huckabee’s comparison of the practice of abortion
to the practice of slavery conjures up a certain kind of fetal
body—a living body with rights—that is in danger without
protections from the government. These conservative
arguments, the same ones that would position the image of a
black man being lynched alongside the image of an aborted
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fetus, are attempting to equate the plight of the figure of the
slave in U.S. history to that of the contemporary fetus. This
slavery analogy must be challenged because it forces
individuals to attach their citizenship to the decision that
abortion is the murder of the fetus. The result is an infantile
citizenship that enslaves us all to the act’s immorality and
requires that we demand abortion restrictions to secure the
freedom of the fetus. By comparing “pro-life morality” to
the abolition of slavery, many fetal rights advocates see
themselves as speaking for a subjugated class of citizens
who cannot speak on their own.
The problem here is that the very status of the fetal
body is precisely the issue being debated. Unlike the bodies
of the men and women who were enslaved and who
abolished slavery, the fetal body presents a challenge for the
pro-life position because its classification as a distinct life is
continually in flux. Put another way, the gap between the
adult body that usually serves as a sign of the citizen, and the
body that is typically imagined as a fetus, helps us
understand how pro-life rhetoric works. This move, we
argue, invests the fetus with a body, a personhood, and a
corresponding citizenship that is separate from and often at
odds with its mother. If the pro-life stance is correct—that
the fetus, like the slave, will one day be set free by law—the
comparison must also be reversed to examine how the fetal
body is ascribed rights and privileges.
Absent a discussion of the pregnant woman and her
rights, fetal citizenship is elevated and given access to justice
through the values of morality and life. Comparing fetuses to
slaves should, contrary to Huckabee’s statement, reinforce
the centrality of the pregnant woman and the mother's body
to any conception of citizenship. Indeed, in opposition to this
pro-life position, we articulate a reversal: the history of
slavery actually warns us against subjugating women to a
construction of pregnancy and re/production as subordinate
to the sign of the fetus. Rhetorical constructions of the fetal
body as analogous to the body of the slave only act to
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devalue the pregnant mother and motherhood by enslaving
both to the fetus.
Power over and through the body: The fetus as “slave”
Many of the laws regulating reproduction are
attempts by the state to control the capacity and energy of
pregnant women in order to “save the fetus.” Furthermore,
comparisons between the fetal body and the slave body are
being juxtaposed in order to harness claims of morality and
to exert additional power over women’s bodies. As LaDelle
McWhorter argues, “the anchor points for exercises of power
are always bodies” (McWhorter, 2004). The target of
regimes of power, she shows, is “bodies—their capacities,
their energies, their pleasures.” The juxtaposition of the
images of lynched slaves and aborted fetuses is an example
of how two such regimes of power intersect and then
consolidate their unique governing apparatus. McWhorter
argues:
(I)n present-day discourse and institutions, race and
sex intersect primarily at points where people think
in terms of normality and abnormality or deviance,
where people have major managerial goals for large
populations, and where there is a strong desire to
control human development. […] if we are to
overcome the oppressive effects of these conceptual
instruments of power, we will have to address the
specific and multileveled regimes of power within
which they were conceived and in which they
continue to function as categories of normalization.
But understanding their genealogical similarities
should make those analyses both less difficult to
construct and more accurate and effective as
antiracist and antisexist interventions in modern
political life (p. 54).
Addressing “specific and multileveled regimes”
implies that we cannot limit our analysis of regimes of
power to present-day abortion discourse; consequently, we
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gesture to a genealogy of slavery and its justifications as a
crucial starting point. More specifically, we ask, how are
arguments that resemble pro-slavery rhetoric appearing in
the abortion controversy? Are there resonances between the
position that “slaves need slavery for their own protection”
and the position that abortion should be restricted because
the fetus needs protection?
During the antebellum era, slaveholders and other
defenders of slavery constructed justifications for slavery
and its continuation, especially in the South. D.F. Ericson
draws attention to one notable justification in defense of
slavery: consent (Ericson 2000). Proponents of slavery were
convinced that a lack of resistance was verification from
slaves that they had agreed to their position in society, and
reasoned that slaves had consented (indirectly) to their
situation (Ericson, p 22). Slaves were perceived and
constituted as generally obedient and content with their
situation. Thomas Roderick Dew, a slave-holding humanities
professor and eventual President of the College of William
of Mary during the 1830’s, was a well-known slavery
apologist. In his piece, Abolition of Negro Slavery, he
asserted:
In the debate in the Virginia legislature, no speaker
insinuated even, we believe that the slaves in
Virginia were not treated kindly; and all too agreed
that they were most abundantly fed, and we have no
doubt but that they form the happiest portion of our
society. A merrier being does not exist on the face of
the globe than the negro slave of the United States.
(Dew, p. 66)
This excerpt demonstrates that some slaveholders believed
that slaves were happy and content with their status. Not
only does this exemplify the naiveté of the slaveholders and
the nature of this commonly held belief, it also exposes the
rationale used to prove that slaves “consented” to their status
because they were relatively happy and merry.
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According to the apologists, the signs of pleasure or
happiness obviously prove that these humans wanted to
remain slaves. James Henry Hammond expressed a similar
view in his “Letter to an English Abolitionist.”
And to sum up all, if pleasure is correctly defined to
be the absence of pain – which, so far as the great
body of mankind is concerned, is undoubtedly its
true definition- I believe our slaves are the happiest
three million of human beings on whom the sun
shines. Into their Eden is coming Satan in the guise
of an abolitionist (Hammond, p. 192).
Hammond’s conception of pleasure allows him to contend
that slaves are happy because “there is an absence of pain.”
This tautological definition is so broad as to be meaningless
and ignores the endemic and soul-destroying pain of being
enslaved. Paternalistic slaveholders could turn a blind eye to
the injustices holding up the practice of slavery, believing
the absurdity that they were providing pleasure to the slaves.
They could thus rationalize treating slaves like objects in
order to provide for their happiness. Thomas Dew referenced
a lack of rebellions as evidence that his thesis (that slaves
were content with their position) was correct, erroneously
observing that there were surprisingly few slave rebellions
during the over two hundred years of slavery in the United
States (Dew; Jenkins).1 Dew and Hammond, among others,
believed that the consent of the slaves may not have been
1

Thomas Roderick Dew in his defense of slavery tried to frame the
insurrections that did take place as a result of the abolishment of slavery.
He argued that insurrections rarely occurred when blacks were enslaved
and that other crimes were more frequent. Furthermore, he pointed out that
the threat of insurrection was very low (Faust, 1990, pp. 69-70). The first
instance of slavery in North America was in New England when the
settlers captured the Pequot American Indians and enslaved them in 1637.
Later, the slave trade reached America and blacks were imported as slaves
because they were better laborers. (Jenkins 3); Thomas R. Dew,
“Abolition of Negro Slavery,” American Quarterly Review, XII (1832)
189-265.
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direct, but their actions served to confirm to the slaveholders
that the slaves were not opposed to their standing in society.2
In the same way, advocates of abortion restrictions
declare that when a woman consents to sex she is
simultaneously consenting to the risk of pregnancy. This
conclusion is flawed because even if the woman’s consent to
sex is explicit, she does not automatically consent to
pregnancy in the same moment. For example, when a person
decides to engage in a dangerous activity she recognizes that
there is a risk of injury but does not necessarily consent to
actually being injured. McDonagh argues that even an
implicit consent to pregnancy is not sufficient to constitute
consent (McDonagh, 1996). She provides the example of
rape, noting that a woman who does not verbally and
explicitly say “no” to sexual intercourse is not implicitly
consenting to intercourse. Furthermore, Koppelman contends
that women should have the right to abort the fetus even if
they have consented to sex because, as reinforced by Bailey
v. Alabama,3 a person has the right to break a contract at any
point in time, despite prior consent to the agreement (1990,
p. 491). Abortion restrictions result in the involuntary
servitude of women to the fetus and effectively impede
pregnant women from exercising their right to break a
contract with the fetus. The Bailey case elucidates the notion
that it is not permissible to criminalize a refusal of service to
another person (or the fetus) because that would constitute a
2

McDonagh compiled definitions of consent: it is a voluntary choice
made by a person that is “direct” and “unequivocal… requiring no
inference or implication to supply its meaning.” The person expressing
consent has to be willing to allow an act to take place upon the body in
question without resistance (McDonagh 6o).
3
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911); Bailey, a black laborer,
was charged with fraud after defying a one year contract and a forward
advancement of $15 for his service with the Riverside Company even
though that fraud may not have been his intent. Justice Hughes stated that
a criminalization of a lack of service imposes involuntary servitude.
(Koppelman 491)
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form of involuntary servitude (Koppelman, 1990, pp. 491493). Koppelmen concludes that it is illegal for the state to
compel a woman to remain pregnant despite the fact she
acquiesced to sexual intercourse.
The application of “consent” as a justification for
slavery extended beyond the consent of blacks to slavery, for
Ericson reveals how the “consent of the governed” was also
deployed by slaveholders who proclaimed that the
government enacted laws in support of slavery because “the
representatives voted for what the governed desired (in the
South that would consist of laws that supported and
protected the institution of slavery)” (Ericson, 2000, p. 22).
In the same way, pro-life members of society claim that
restrictive abortion laws represent the desires of all the
people and are thus made with the consent of the governed.
Many citizens may endorse abortion restrictions, but the
logic behind the “consent of the governed” argument is
unsound because it ignores the ways that legislators exert
biopower over pregnant women, just as slaveholders exerted
biopower over their slaves. Slavery systematized the
subordination of black men and women, for example, when
slaveholders raped female slaves as a means to acquire more
slaves. Paternalistic rhetoric is deeply embedded in the
discourses that constitute slaves and fetuses, a disturbing
tone common in justifications for slavery. As Ulrich B.
Philips and John David Smith contended, slavery was an
educative system for the civilization of the seemingly savage
but child-like blacks that needed the help of paternalistic
slaveholders (Foster, p. 666).4
Slave owners presumed they were helping the blacks
by exposing them to a “superior culture” and educating them
about racial inferiority (Ericson, 2000, p. 25). According to
some slaveholders, abolishing slavery would jeopardize the
4

Ulrich B. Philips was the author of American Negro Slavery, a defense
of slavery in the South post-Revolutionary War era and into the early
1800s. Additionally, John David Smith is the author of An Old Creed for
the New South: Proslavery Ideology and Historiography, 1865-1918.
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development of human progress, in particular the progress
and development of blacks.5 Dew was concerned with the
impact of emancipation on progress:
An emancipation of our slaves would check at once
that progress of improvement, which is now so
manifest among them. The whites would either
gradually withdraw, and leave whole districts or
settlements in their possession, in which case they
would sink rapidly in the scale of civilization; or the
blacks, by closer intercourse, would bring the whites
down to their level. In the contact between the
civilized and uncivilized man, all history and
experience show, that the former will be sure to sink
to the level of the latter (Dew, p. 56).
Slavery was seen as a means to elevate society from its
primitive state, a mechanism, according to George Fitzhugh,
for the strong to protect the weak (Ericson, 2000, p. 110).
Paternalistic rhetoric turns women, like slaves, into
children who need guidance, especially with regards to
making decisions about abortion and pregnancy. Laws such
as informed consent are the state’s attempt to persuade
women to make the “correct” choice by providing them with
detailed information about abortion and its effects on the
fetus. These laws presume that pregnant women are unaware
of what an abortion actually is or its consequences. After
being presented with biased information, women are then
forced to wait twenty-four hours before selecting the
procedure again. Abrams suggests that this form of
paternalism denies women the ability to make their own
independent choices (Abrams, 1995, p. 488). Informed
consent and the twenty-four hour waiting period are just a
few of the more blatant examples of paternalism in anti5

Evidence of the belief of racial inferiority is seen in Dew’s Abolition of
Negro Slavery; “… the slave is not only economically but morally unfit
for freedom. And first, idleness and consequent want, are of themselves
sufficient to generate a catalogue of vices of the most mischievous ad
destructive character.” (Dew 53)
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abortion rhetoric. Justice Stevens in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey points out in his dissent that the waiting period relies
on flawed notions about a woman’s ability to make
important decisions.6 Each limitation on abortion is another
paternalistic move by the state to control the pregnant
woman and make sure she does not act irrationally. Just as
slaveholders pointed out the benefits of slavery for the
slaves, the Justices in Casey defend abortion restrictions by
contending that it may be better for the psychological health
of the woman not to have the procedure, and that the waiting
period thus allows for the woman to make a proper
decision.7
The similarities between slavery and abortion
restrictions do not stop there. Despite the separation of
church and state, religion plays an important role in
everyday life and politics as a whole. Likewise, during the
era of slavery, apologists justified slavery by alluding to its
presence in the Bible. Defenses of slavery contained in the
Bible ranged from the Hebrews having slaves to Jesus not
condemning Rome’s brutal forms of slavery. Other slavery
proponents would point to a letter by Paul to Philemon that
advises a servant return to his master and serve him
obediently (Ericson, 2000, p. 19). Thornton Stringfellow, a
Baptist minister and a prominent slaveholder in Virginia,
focused his works on the benevolent aspects of bondage
(Faust, 1981, p. 136). In his essay, A Brief Examination of
Scripture Testimony on the Institution of Slavery, he drew on
the authority of the Bible in order to prove his point:
…we have shown from the text of the sacred
volume, that when God entered into covenant with
Abraham, it was with him as a slaveholder; that
when he took his posterity by the hand in Egypt, five
6

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505. U.S.
833 (1992)
7
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505. U.S.
833 (1992)
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hundred years afterwards to confirm the promise
made by Abraham, it was done with them as
slaveholders; that when he gave them a constitution
of government, he gave them the right to perpetuate
hereditary slavery […]
We have also shown from authentic history
that the institution of slavery existed in every family,
and in every province of the Roman Empire, at the
time the gospel was published to them. […]
We have also shown from the New
Testaments, that all the churches are recognized as
composed of masters and servants; and that they are
instructed by Christ by how to discharge their
relative duties; and finally, that in reference to the
question which was then started, whether
Christianity did not abolish the institution, or the
right of one Christian to hold another Christian in
bondage, we have shown, that “the words of our
Lord Jesus Christ” are, that so far from this being the
case, it adds to the obligation of the servant to render
service with good will to his master, and that gospel
fellowship is not to be entertained with persons who
will not consent to it!
I will propose, in fourth place, to show that
the institution of slavery is full of mercy. […] this
institution was a motive for sparing the prisoner’s
life. […] (Stringfellow, p. 165).
This excerpt illustrates how Biblical examples of slavery and
obligations of servitude were used to conclude that slavery
was acceptable and necessary. Slavery apologists like Dew
who asserted that no religious law prohibiting slavery
existed (in Faust, 1981, p. 61) also contributed to the notion
that slavery was acceptable in the eyes of God. To a
Christian nation, the obligation of the servant to serve, as
pointed out by the Lord, was seen as a compelling reason to
maintain slavery. Additionally, Stringfellow points out that
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historically slavery had good intentions: the desire to “save”
lives.
Thus, to slavery apologists, the institution also
served as a method for Christianizing the slaves. James
Henry Hammond, a pro-slavery plantation owner who
eventually was elected to Congress in the House of
Representatives and later to the Senate, used the Christian
conversion argument to defend his proposal to re-open the
slave trade (Faust, 1981, pp. 168-169, 171). The
Christianizing process was seen as a way to save the blacks
from all the evils of the world. While paternalism may creep
in through many justifications for slavery, the combination
of proselytizing and missionary guilt within the religious
justifications was particularly ironic. Stringfellow, for
example, argued in his essay that the institution of slavery
prevented the extinction of the slaves, an outcome that
would have been certain if the slaves were freed:
In their bondage here on earth, they have been much
better provided for, and great multitudes of them
have been made the freeman of the Lord Jesus
Christ, and left this world rejoicing in hope of the
glory of God. […] An officious meddling with the
institution, from feelings and sentiments unknown to
the Bible, may lead to the extermination of the slave
race among us, who, taken as a while, are utterly
unprepared for a high civil state; but benefit them, it
cannot. Their condition, as a class, is now better
than that of any other equal number of laborers on
earth, and is daily improving (Stringfellow, p 166).
Slaves are represented here as children who cannot take care
of themselves. In the eyes of the apologists, freedom would
condemn the slaves to death because they would be
incapable of finding God and providing for themselves
without the help of white slave owners. Today, religious
discourse profoundly influences the public discussion of
abortion restrictions. To abort a fetus is to kill a human life
according to some religions, a belief that has an impact on
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legislation concerning abortion at the state and national
level. Speaking to an anti-abortion group in 2007, President
George W. Bush invoked an explicitly religious argument
against abortion and called on the adult citizen to protect the
fetal one:
It is important for all Americans to remember that
our Declaration of Independence states that every
person has the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. It also states that these rights come from
our Creator, and that governments are formed to
secure these rights for all their citizens. And we
believe every human life has value, and we pray for
the day when every child is welcome in life and
protected into law (“President Bush Calls,” 2007).
As Bush rooted proper citizenship in religious faith, he
invested the fetus with rights, and the pregnant woman
became an afterthought when compared to the apparently
vulnerable fetus. As we turn more directly to questions
surrounding citizenship, it is important to note the common
element of “servitude”—or the harnessing of the body for
interests external to the body—between anti-abortion policy
and the institution of slavery. Exploring this common
element may open space for a new challenge against
infantile citizenship that emphasizes equality, justice, and
freedom from bodily intrusion.
Citizenship as (opposition to) involuntary servitude
Just as many slaveholders argued that they were
helping to protect the slaves, the pro-life movement tries to
promote an image of the fetus in desperate need of the state’s
good will—an unprotected person vulnerable to a wayward
mother’s will. Fetal personhood transforms women into
chattel and re-entrenches their inequality by treating them as
a collective incubator. If a woman is forced into the position
of property, it is reasonable to assert that her citizenship is
jeopardized and uncertain. What happens to citizenship as a
whole when the fetus is given access to its umbrella? Lauren
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Berlant uncovers the true state of citizenship within the U.S.
as a result of the independence of the fetus: “A nation made
for adult citizens has been replaced by one imagined for
fetuses and children” (Berlant, 1997, p. 1). Berlant names
this “fetal citizenship” because both the fetus and the adults
surrounding it begin to lack full citizenship: the fetus lacks
full legal citizenship because it is contingent on the already
limited rights of the mother, and adults lack full citizenship
because they have ceded their reproductive rights to
governmental control.
It appears, under the unified sign of citizenship, that
this fetal standard can be used to compromise all other forms
of identity, race and gender in order to create a more unified
nation and “resolve” conflict (Berlant, 1997). Abortion
restrictions are an example of creating fetal citizenship in
that they attempt to resolve conflict between the woman and
the fetus while washing away the woman’s identity based on
gender or pregnancy. The pregnant woman is forgotten in
the equation even though she is the essential component: she
provides the body necessary for the fetus’s existence and
survival. Representations of the independent fetus contribute
to the constitution of the pregnant woman as a child with
limited agency who needs help making important decisions
in her life. In this way, Berlant suggests, “the pregnant
woman becomes the child to the fetus” (Berlant, 1997, p.
85).
This process by which a paternalistic state controls the
bodies of its citizens is familiar to the black population in the
United States. By law, through prejudice in society, and in
demonizing representations, blacks have been treated as less
than human, as either uncivilized or unable to make proper
decisions. Proslavery arguments propagated these views of
blacks by positing the slave’s inability to survive in
civilization without the help of their slaveholders. This
rhetoric of inferiority, codified in the U.S. Constitution for
many years, reinforced the idea that slaves were property
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and unworthy of citizenship.8 Only after the Emancipation
Proclamation and the 13th and 14th Amendments passed
were blacks recognized as humans with a standing as full
citizens. The problem in this instance is that personhood in
the civil rights arena cannot be blindly applied in the context
of the fetus. We align ourselves with Berlant (1997) when
she claims that fetuses should not be added as “persons” to
the concept of “people” because such a move would disrupt
the “norms and principles of national embodiment” and the
distinctions between the two groups (such as occupying an
autonomous body and possessing ability to vote) would
begin to disappear (pp. 97-98). Giving the fetus rights allows
the state to speak for the fetus, denying the rights and
citizenship of the pregnant woman who now exists to
“serve” the fetus.
Likewise, the enslavement of blacks constituted
involuntary servitude, a means of controlling the black body
within the production of services and labor for the benefit of
the slaveholders. In an attempt to link these instances,
Koppelman (1990) notes that the Supreme Court has deemed
involuntary servitude as compulsory labor that is provided
by one person for the benefit of another (Koppelman).9 Is
there a valid comparison between historical conditions of
slavery as involuntary servitude and abortion restrictions as
involuntary servitude? One of the many tragic effects of
slavery was the slaves’ loss of control over their own bodies
8

At the Constitutional Convention the Three-Fifths Compromise between
Northern and Southern States was created. For the purpose of
representation in the House of Representatives, slaves were counted as
three fifths of a person, thus allowing the South to have more
representatives than if only the white population was counted. This
dehumanized slaves and reinforced their position as less than human.
Once again, slaves were only important as long as they benefited the white
male property owner. Their own political situation was of no importance
to slaveholders, other whites or the state (Berlant 18
9
Slaughter House Cases 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873); Plessey v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1,
16 (1906); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911).
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(Condit, 1994, p. 71-72). In the same way, the combination
of an unwanted pregnancy and restrictions on reproductive
choice results in the dehumanization of pregnant women by
situating them as chattel. Women who have unwanted
pregnancies are often compelled to be mothers by the State,
and are no longer in possession of free agency and control
over their own bodies. They have become servants “with a
special duty to serve others and not themselves”
(Koppelman, 1990, p. 487). In this sense, women who are
compelled to continue their pregnancy and become mothers
without their own consent are encompassed by the definition
of involuntary servitude.
If abortion restrictions create involuntary servitude,
then the Thirteenth Amendment may protect the rights of a
woman with an unwanted pregnancy to be free from
involuntary servitude to the fetus (Koppelman).10, 11
Citizenship, in theory, also means that blacks should control
what they produce and that the white slaveholders could no
longer control the labor and production of other human
beings. The thirteenth amendment gives citizens control over
their bodies and the productive capabilities they have—
individuals own their own service. Production or produce—
the core of what servitude and slavery are concerned with—
also applies to women and their capability to (re)produce.
When they are forced to serve interests besides their own,
when they lose their identity and find themselves treated as
(re)producers and not humans, pregnant women are
positioned as the property of society and a vessel for the
fetus. The Thirteenth Amendment makes no delineation
10

The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
11
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873)

Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 29 (2008)

182

between people to which the amendment should apply
(Koppelman, 1990, p. 488). We contend that the amendment
and the concept should apply to pregnant women even if
their servitude is generally not as extreme as that
experienced by slaves. In other words, it should be illegal for
the state to compel a woman to remain pregnant despite the
fact she acquiesced to sexual intercourse just as it is illegal to
possess slaves (p. 491).
Conclusions
It is important to think of abortion restrictions as a
form of involuntary servitude because of the impact they
have on women across the country. Addressing how regimes
of power are conceived and implemented is necessary in
order to challenge and resist these oppressive regimes
(McWhorter, 2004, p. 54). To ignore the possibility that
what women experience, when compelled by the state to
carry a fetus, is involuntary servitude is to allow for the
continuation of pregnancy slavery in this country. We do not
intend to trivialize what blacks experienced under slavery
and there is no doubt of the unfathomably severe, violent,
widespread, and dehumanizing consequences of slavery in
this country. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the logic
behind the slavery of blacks and the control of the pregnant
body cannot and should not be compared. The process by
which women are enslaved through paternalism, a loss of
rights, and the reduction to property is reminiscent of
slavery.
Coming full circle, when we see images of a fetus
juxtaposed with images of lynched black men, we cannot
ignore this comparison. The aim of this juxtaposition is to
associate the immorality of lynching with the immorality of
aborting a fetus, but close scrutiny disrupts the aim itself by
demonstrating the very tangible erasure of the pregnant
woman and the inapplicability of the slave-fetus analogy.
We have to challenge the representations of the fetus as
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always outside of the womb because the woman’s body
existed before the fetus and is the pre-requisite for the fetus.
The pregnant body can become a site of resistance to
state power because it no longer focuses on the separate
entity that the body has the capacity to produce. This move
helps explain that the fetus is not the enemy, for the real
enemies are “those who would appropriate and solidify the
symbolics of procreation in the service of social agendas
hostile to women’s procreative integrity” (Morgan and
Michaels, 1999, p. 6). By focusing on the pregnant body, the
fetus is “reconnected” to the woman and prevents her
erasure, which is a necessary step to prevent the reduction of
her citizenship to “fetal citizenship” and infantilization.
Using slavery as the starting point for our research and
analyzing how pro-slavery arguments are resurfacing in prolife arguments today allows us to understand how power
relations intersect and contribute to involuntary servitude.
Our hope is that exposing the ways in which the state
controls individuals through both pro-slavery and pro-life
rhetoric could help challenge specific oppressive power
structures surrounding citizenship.
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